

Policy Issues in Integration for Rural Development: The Case of the Population/Family Planning Program

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Conceptually, integration implies interdependent and interactive linkages between and among different specialized activities. It is operationalized in the Philippine population/family planning program as the linking of specialized population/family planning activities with social development activities like nutrition, education, sanitation or with economic activities such as food production, cottage industries, agricultural extension and other income-generating activities. Its dynamics as analyzed in the cases on population/family planning programs of Batangas and Laguna highlights problem-areas of integration at the policy and program implementation levels. These are: incongruence of national with local goals and objectives, contradiction between decentralization and control in central-local relations, vague organizational structures and management procedures particularly in the funding and personnel aspects, passive citizen participation and weak sectoral and environmental linkages. Policy review and evaluation of population/family planning program, shift decentralization and decontrol, action program for active citizen participation are some of the recommended measures to achieve integration. A systematic and holistic approach is required in the resolution of the policy issues of integration as well as in the implementation of recommended measures to effectively achieve family planning/population program integration.

Introduction

This paper presents two cases on integration of population/family planning with local/rural development: one in Laguna¹ and the other in Batangas.² These cases raise issues at policy, programming, and implementation levels in the integration process by focusing on critical variables such as political leadership, financial capacity, management planning and control,

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and development priorities. Community and citizen participation within the integration network is also analyzed. Specifically, the study aims to (1) determine whether or not local governments are capable of managing the integrated local component of the national population/family planning program, (2) identify the factors influencing the policy of integration and its implementation, and (3) understand better the dynamics of the integrated approach to rural development.

Concept of Integration and Rural Development

The concept of integration basically implies interdependent and interactive linkages between and among different specialized activities.³ The integration of population/family planning with rural development implies the linking of specialized population/family planning activities with other specialized social development activities like health, nutrition, education, sanitation or with economic activities such as food production, cottage industries, farming and agricultural extension, and other income-generating activities.

Integration can be distinguished as structure and as process. Integration in structure may take place independently of integration in process, and vice-versa. Integration can also vary in the number of activities that are linked together, in its extent and scope, and in quantity. It can be smooth and cooperative, or it can be marked by competition and conflict.⁴

Development refers to "increased capability to attain accelerated growth, to enhance the quality of life of the broad masses of the population, and to achieve the desired political goals of the nation."⁵ Rural development, on the other hand, refers to the "process designed to enhance the economic, social and political life of poor people in defined rural areas."⁶ Or it is a "planned process using any form of action or communication designed to change the environment, techniques, institutions, and attitudes of rural people in such a way as to eliminate their poverty and improve their way of life."⁷

Integrating Population/Family Planning with Rural Development: A Tale of Two Provinces

A. *The Laguna Experience*

The drive for rural development. The Laguna experience in integrating population/family planning with rural development was a response to the locally identified problem of overpopulation vis-a-vis socio-economic development. Upon assumption of office in 1960, then incumbent Governor⁸ noted the negative effects of population explosion on socio-economic gains. A socio-economic survey undertaken to provide baseline information for

development planning showed two significant findings: a recurring shortage of food supply due to inadequate production and a rapidly increasing population.

The first five-year development plan of the province, known as Systematic Program for Rural Economic Assistance and Development (SPREAD) emphasized five areas of concern: 1) improvement of provincial and municipal governments' capacity for public service; 2) increased agricultural productivity; 3) industrial development; 4) promotion of tourism and recreation; and 5) better health, education, and welfare program. The last area consisted of applied nutrition, family planning, maternal and child health, and school construction.

To ensure effective implementation of the plan, provincial and municipal task forces were organized to oversee the process. To enhance administrative capability, tax assessment and collection was intensified, the infrastructure program was strengthened, and the management capability of local executives, particularly in planning and coordination, was improved through training.

The strategy for agricultural productivity consisted of better selection and distribution of seeds and farm inputs; putting up of applied research and farm service centers; supervised rural credit facilities; livestock and secondary crops; and provision of drying, warehousing, and marketing facilities. To facilitate agricultural technology transfer, demonstration farms were set up and technical assistance was sought from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Baños.

Activating a local family planning program. To effect the second thrust of SPREAD to control population growth, family planning was incorporated as an integral subprogram of the provincial development plan. As early as 1966, Laguna tried to integrate family planning activities with rural development program. This commenced three years before a national policy on population control was formulated and four years before a national population/family planning program was set in motion.

To strengthen the program, citizen participation in addition to local government responsibility, was conceived as part of the program philosophy. Community participation was interpreted as involving the residents under the leadership of the local executives to take part in planning and implementation, and in monitoring and assessing the program. It also meant contributing to the local resources to fund the program by paying their taxes accurately and on time.

Mobilizing local participation in FP activities. Family planning activities at the start of the program consisted mainly of information, education, and communication (IEC) campaign spearheaded by the Governor himself. He sought the assistance of private family planning organizations, and Protestant and other religious groups. The information and education campaign focused on the deleterious effects of rapid population growth on economic gains. It also underscored how rapid population growth leads to a situation where there are more dependents than producers, thus contributing to poverty and other social and economic ills.

Attempts to put family planning clinics to provide artificial contraceptive services met stiff opposition from politicians who feared repercussions from the religious sector and the people who are largely Catholics. To neutralize the initial opposition of local politicians to family planning contraception, the Governor set on an educational/diplomacy strategy for provincial and municipal leaders. He stressed the importance of the family planning effort and enlisted their commitment through the local task forces organized for the implementation of the local/rural development plan. Through them, local leaders were made to understand the family planning objectives, its contents and thrusts, and the need for its implementation.

Active participation by the local political leaders was secured when the local legislative bodies⁹ responded by way of appropriations to support the program. In this manner, a complementary thrust of the local leadership reinforced the efforts on IEC directed to the mass base.

Participation at the barangay levels was activated through the local leadership which, in turn, endorsed the program. To penetrate the grassroots, community assemblies were held in the barangays. These assemblies were presided by the Governor who came with the municipal mayors, barangay captains, and leaders of community organizations. Free clinics were conducted during the community assemblies. These later evolved into an indigency health program.

Managing the local FP program. Family planning activities during this time were organized under the Office of the Governor. Coordination of the various subprograms of the provincial development plan was the responsibility of the provincial chief executive with the dynamic participation of municipal and barangay leaders. The local authority had full and inclusive supervision and control over family planning projects so that changes and adjustments warranted by local needs and conditions were easily made. The internal funding of the family planning program also contributed to independence and full autonomy in decision-making. These conditions enhanced program flexibility which kept the program responsive to local demands.

Internal evaluation on the implementation of the provincial development plan and its component parts, including that of family planning, provided for continuous monitoring and assessment. Most of the techniques of evaluation utilized were monthly meetings, bi-monthly dialogues and reporting sessions, and quarterly/annual reviews. The evaluation procedure was simple: actual gains were measured against planned targets and objectives of the specific year of implementation and of the overall plan. With management completely in the hands of the local government, the evaluation results were fed back into the recycling of the plans/subprograms.

When the Project Office for Maternal and Child Health (POMCH) was set up with funding assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1968 under the supervision of the Department of Health, the Governor of Laguna seized the opportunity to set up 13 family planning clinics in the province under a USAID/POMCH arrangement. It marked the first time that artificial contraception became available to the people. The health/ family planning strategy was later boosted by a cancer detection service and a nutrition improvement package.

Launching of a national population/family planning program. The adoption of a national population policy and subsequent creation of the Commission on Population (POPCOM) in 1969 heralded the formal launching of a population/family planning program in 1970. The national population program is premised on the policies/strategies of integration and multi-agency participation. Family planning activity was originally conceived to be integrated with sectoral and local development programs to effect impact and to make use of existing organizational structures forming a national network for operations rather than put up a separate structure.

POPCOM, being the coordinating body for population activities, refrained from having a competing line structure. Instead, the organizational strategy aimed at structural integration by mounting the national program upon the implementing systems of participating agencies of both public and private sectors with POPCOM as the lead institution. POPCOM assumed central planning, funding and coordinating functions.

Fitting in the local FP program. The launching and implementation of the national population program was timely for resolving the issue confronting the Laguna program: that of expanding the service delivery system to accommodate the increasing number of motivated beneficiaries. Laguna immediately signed up as an implementing agency. The subagreement with POPCOM continued the funding for operation of the 13 existing clinics. To strengthen clinic service delivery, the province opened four locally-funded clinics.

With the subagreement, Laguna family planning activities became integrated with the national program, thereby giving up some of its autonomy over the family planning activities and their management. In return, it gained some benefits in terms of funding, contraceptive supplies, and training support. The local FP program shared the goals and objectives of the national program, implemented national population policies, and complied with nationally-imposed standards of performance. However, the local program lost its planning prerogatives¹⁰ and the power of the communities to decide where they are going and what means to take. The program design, in effect, reduced the local program and people to extensions of the national population program organization and thus became instruments in distributing population information, resources, and services.

The local program had difficulty adapting to the national and foreign administrative systems and environments and to its local environment and needs. As a consequence of adjustments to new relationships with other implementing public and private agencies in the national program network having field operations in Laguna, the local program system suffered administrative overload and temporary lowering of performance output.

The gradual proliferation of family planning activities of the various agencies operating in the province made the job of coordinating the provincial network difficult for the Governor. His immediate reaction to the state of program affairs was to have all the different programs of the various institutions integrated into his own family planning program, structurally and processwise. Legally, it could not be done. The programs and personnel of the various implementing agencies operating locally were under the authority of, and were answerable to their respective agencies' national and regional officials. Processwise, it was very difficult to integrate since each public and private institutions had its own program priorities, objectives and targets, and strategies of implementation. The major effect of integration of the local program into the national program was its move away from the mainstream of provincial/rural development activities toward national population goals. Moreover, the local family planning program became more concerned with its performance outputs in relation with national goals rather than with local economic and social development goals under SPREAD.

Steering through national program changes. A national program performance evaluation in 1974 showed a plateauing of acceptors, a shift from more effective to less effective methods of contraception, and a limited capacity to reach out and penetrate the rural areas. The response to these findings was a change in the conceptual formulation of the program from a clinic-based, contraceptive-orientation to a community-based, development orientation. Specifically, the shift was away from its clinic and urban bias in favor of community and rural development. The concept of family planning

was also broadened to include family welfare. To implement the changes, the strategies of "total integrated development approach" (TIDA) and "OUT-REACH" were adopted for implementation.

(1) *TIDA application in Laguna.* Responding to the move, Laguna signed up as one of the pilot provinces involved in TIDA, whose primary aim was the integration of population/family planning components with rural developmental activities. TIDA included a development philosophy which involved the (a) integration down to the community level of all population program services funded and coordinated by POPCOM, and (b) participation by the implementing agencies and the communities in planning, organizing, management, funding, and the provision of services. TIDA was an approach "beyond family planning."

As an implementing strategy, TIDA was designed to carry out family planning and population activities as part of an integrated package of community services and to unite the development workers of other agencies in the provision of services. TIDA called for the deployment of population officers at the provincial, municipal, and district levels who were to join the "team of development workers" in providing services to the rural communities and its people in any aspect of health, nutrition, social welfare, agricultural extension, family planning, sanitation, among others. Barangays were utilized as development councils to serve as points for motivation, service delivery, follow-up/maintenance, and as data sources. TIDA, however, initially envisioned a limited local government participation since it projected a progressively increasing local participation through funding and management of the program by local authorities until such time that they become fully self-reliant.

The implementation of TIDA in Laguna imposed dual supervision upon the local program. TIDA personnel were subject to the active management and control by POPCOM national and regional officials. The Governor, as Project Director, exercised minimal supervision over the local program due to the administrative requirements that he must comply with. Conceptually, TIDA would return the Laguna family planning program as an integral component of its rural development plan and one in a package of community services to facilitate economic and social upliftment of the rural communities. Management-wise, the role of the Governor as dynamic program head similar to his role in the original program was not restored due to the POPCOM prerogative for technical supervision and planning/funding controls. Another aspect of TIDA which was of great significance to overall program administration was the activation of a line structure down to the barangay level which made POPCOM appear and behave as an implementing agency and competitor in the field to the consternation of the implementing agencies. After more than a year of implementation and evaluation, TIDA

was phased out. The evaluation results pointed to lower expected program performance because the family planning workers who were trained as development workers performed more the "other services" than family planning.

Looking at TIDA as an integrated package of development services, it provided the rural communities a service delivery system which could answer most, if not all, of the services needed by a given client, be it an individual, a family, or a community. It also linked the services of several agency providers of government to meet community/people needs in a more coordinated, comprehensive way. In the process of service integration, bureaucratic requirements made the multi-agency integrated delivery channel inefficient and ineffective, to the disgust and confusion of both service administrators and providers and the beneficiaries.

Laguna, with the phasing out of TIDA, lost a chance to bring back its local family planning program on the same footing as before: an autonomous, local and integral part of rural development. TIDA was superseded by the OUTREACH project.

(2) *OUTREACH implementation in Laguna.* OUTREACH affected significantly the Laguna family planning program as it influenced the implementation of the integration policy. The OUTREACH concept attempted to reconcile structural and process integration by trying to function as a single-purpose program involved in the process of local/rural development. In other words, it tried to achieve structural integration of multi-service package of health, family planning, sanitation, education, and nutrition. OUTREACH offered the single service of fertility control.

Organizationally, the Laguna family planning program as a sub-contracted activity under the OUTREACH concept had a structure which started from POPCOM central office to the region, to the province through the Office of the Governor then down to the municipal and barangay levels by way of full-time outreach workers and barangay service point officers. Managerially, although the Governor was formally designated as Project Director at the provincial level, the powers and authority of the Governor were virtually curtailed by the administrative requirements imposed by POPCOM and USAID with regard to funds, personnel, management decisions, and operating procedures.¹¹ This reduced the Governor's position to one that was organizationally and administratively weak and vulnerable.

Operational problems encountered during the process of implementation substantiated this weakness and vulnerability. First, there was the problem of funding and financial flow. While the province most often succeeded in providing and releasing its shares of the program costs, the national funding scheme indicated the contrary. Since its initial implementa-

tion in the province, inadequate and untimely flow of financial inputs to the operating levels became a recurring problem in the population program.

When USAID funds are channeled to POPCOM, they become national funds which must be treated as trust funds, as required by USAID. As national funds, the accounting and auditing procedures followed are those of the national government system. Upon release to the local governments, they are subject to local government accounting and auditing procedures. The process normally entails a delay ranging from two to six months for the funds to be received and disbursed at the operating levels.^{1 2}

Another fiscal problem was the reimbursement scheme adopted for fund releases. The system resulted in many cases where claims for actual expenses were not allowed for payment, and those disallowed for payment were borne by the OUTREACH workers. Operationally, the POPCOM/USAID financial system resulted in recurring and unresolved delays in salaries and travel allowances which in turn dampened personnel motivation and performance. It also caused wastage of time and effort necessary to meet the administrative requirements as well as much paper work and loss of time and effort which could have been used for field work.

A second major problem encountered by the local program dealt with personnel. The dual supervision scheme and the contractual status of OUTREACH workers brought about confusing and conflicting supervisory relationship, job insecurity, low motivation and morale, and fast turnover. Unclearly defined roles and relationships of the OUTREACH personnel with those of implementing agencies operating in Laguna resulted in unresolved conflicts between the OUTREACH workers and the clinic personnel. OUTREACH workers were confused with regard to dual supervision. They were also confused as to their true identity. Are they national government employees since they were paid out of national funds, or are they local government employees since they were appointed by the Governor?

Weak environmental and program linkages also beset OUTREACH operations. OUTREACH came into operation too soon. The implementing public and private agencies which subcontracted part of their own individual programs with POPCOM were not clarified nor made to understand how OUTREACH would affect their programs. To the implementing agencies, the OUTREACH made POPCOM a giant competitor in the field with the superior advantage of powers to control by policy, plan, and funds.

OUTREACH also suffered from poor relationship and ineffective coordination between itself and the other subprograms of rural development as conceived and implemented through its provincial development plan. This could be traced not only to variance in performance indicators adopted by

each subprogram but also to the isolation process which was a consequence of OUTREACH striking out on its own. To cope with these problems, the Governor recalled the retired provincial official who was responsible for action in social development under SPREAD.¹³ He was appointed as Provincial Population Officer (PPO). A veteran in the provincial affairs, political and otherwise, the designated PPO was able to solve temporarily some of the existing personnel, funding, and linkage problems. To solve the delays in releases of POPCOM funds, the PPO, who had long enjoyed the trust and confidence of other provincial officials, especially the Provincial Treasurer and Auditor, was able to "borrow" some local funds from time to time to tide over OUTREACH operations. He was also able to improve personnel morale and motivation by dynamic management and leadership by example. He instituted some of the techniques of coordination and diplomacy which were effective under SPREAD. As a result, some of the non-cooperative implementing agencies began to work with some degree of teamwork.

Despite the palliative measures, the major problems of personnel, funding, and coordination remained in the national program and in OUTREACH. They were systemic problems and, therefore, needed systemic solutions. The provincial government of Laguna was not new in family planning, and it could be advantageous to the province, its people, and the program itself, if it retained program and fund management.

B. The Batangas Experience

(1) *Project Compassion (PROCOM)*: Involvement of the province of Batangas with the national population program came in 1976 by way of Project Compassion, a project spearheaded by the First Lady and initially funded by the Population Center Foundation (PCF).¹⁴ PROCOM was conceived as a rural development strategy integrating four social service programs, namely: nutrition, food production (Green Revolution), environmental sanitation, and family planning. It aimed to assist local governments at the municipal and barangay levels in the implementation of the four-pronged programs. It utilizes local resources to improve the quality of life of families within their jurisdiction. The family planning component of PROCOM constituted the initial family planning program activities ever implemented in the province.

As an integrated social service program, PROCOM was organized on the premise of local government self-reliance and citizen participation. The role of the PROCOM central management was limited to that of a catalyst for a local social development program. The local authorities and families were responsible for the acquisition and application of knowledge and skills necessary for them to practice proper nutrition, produce some of their food, plan their families, and improve their physical and environmental conditions.

Following the conceptual project design, family development officers were appointed at the provincial and municipal levels. As contract employees, they were accountable to the provincial governor and to the municipal mayors. Their salaries and administrative expenses were pegged at existing local government scales and paid out of provincial and municipal funds. Financing of the project activities came exclusively from the budgets of the implementing local governments and from contributions of the barangays participating in the project.

PROCOM at the local level was directly organized as a program under the governors and the mayors of the respective provincial and municipal governments. The circumstances of recruitment and appointment of family development officers, their salary scales and sources, and the clear-cut supervisory relationship between the provincial governor and the provincial family development officers easily identified the PROCOM workers as local government employees. Consequently, the program itself was a local program.

To carry out the program at the barangay level, the municipal family development officers assisted the barangay captains in the selection and training of "unit leaders" who served as links between the barangay captains and 20 family units in the barangay. The family planning services were delivered through the conduit starting with the municipal family development officers to the barangay captains to the barangay families' unit leaders and finally, to the barangay families.

Then incumbent provincial Governor¹⁵ delegated almost entirely the conduct of project activities to the provincial family development officer. Being a very active political supporter and loyal friend of the Governor, the provincial family development officer allegedly abused her delegated authority, acted very authoritatively, and operated with maximum autonomy.

(2) *OUTREACH in Batangas*. When PROCOM terminated its pilot project life in 1977, OUTREACH took over its family planning component. Under the OUTREACH arrangement, a family planning structure was set in place.¹⁶ Its management and supervision was technically placed under POPCOM with the provincial governor retaining administrative supervision. In contrast to the four service-concentrations of PROCOM, OUTREACH focused on family planning activity which was operationally detached from the rest of the social services. With the shift of the PROCOM activity to OUTREACH, the provincial family development officer was reappointed as provincial population officer.

During the transition period, the provincial family planning activity shifted from a local integrated social service program under the Governor

to a POPCOM-controlled and supervised single service program of birth control. While OUTREACH program was being strengthened under POPCOM, a change in the provincial political leadership took place.

(3) *Implementation Dynamics and Problems.*

(a) *Attitudes and motivation of the political leadership*

The election of a new opposition governor was ominous for the local family planning program. His initial act with regard to OUTREACH activities was to redefine the relationship between the provincial leadership and the POPCOM-funded OUTREACH network. The major thrust of the new network of relationship was to change the common practice under the past political leadership wherein the "provincial population officer (PPO) acts like she is the project director." Gradually, the new incumbent Governor recalled delegated authority until the powers of the PPO were reduced and the PPO was placed in subordinate position to the Governor as project director.

Being a very busy man, the Governor delegated his project director role to the Senior Executive Assistant,¹⁷ although he retained the responsibility for the program. Program operation was monitored by the Governor through the Senior Executive Assistant. In an interview, program responsibility was described by the Governor as:

We want to change the pattern of relationship to make the Governor the real project director of the program. The PPO is expected to refer matters requiring political decisions as well as report the progress of implementation to the Office of the Governor. I see to it that I read all reports of the PPO and write my comments on them for feedback.¹⁸

Even the superiors of the PPO in POPCOM central and regional offices were impressed by the new leadership's decision. Dealing directly with the Office of the Governor would break the practice of by-passing the Governor on matters regarding OUTREACH.

The political power and strong personality of the Governor had started to counter the previous practice of treating the provincial executive as a dummy project director. Besides sending loud and clear messages to the POPCOM higher authorities and lower outreach workers that he was taking an active and direct hand in the management of the program, he also made it clear that when the program is turned over to the province, it will have to fit in with local needs and resources, especially with the provincial policy, development goals, and pay schemes. Meanwhile, the PPO had started a system of consultation, decision referrals, and information feedback on matters affecting the program.

The pattern of working and interpersonal relationship in the OUTREACH activity followed personal and political affiliations which were deeply rooted in the implementing network. Thus, while the relationship between the Governor and the PPO had been shown to evolve a new pattern of cooperation, the provincial and municipal relations tended toward the pattern of non-cooperation and lack of teamwork, since many of the newly elected and reelected mayors belonged to the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the majority ruling party.

Although the Governor and his Senior Executive Assistant viewed family planning favorably and positively, it did not merit high priority as a developmental thrust. The provincial development priorities dealt with programs having immediate economic returns like food production, road construction, employment, and other income generating activities. Both believed that the present problem confronting the province was economic growth, and it was only when the local economy had provided enough food and employment that's family planning come as a matter of course, together with health, nutrition, and education.

In the case of municipal mayors, the general attitude toward family planning was on the whole positive, but not to the OUTREACH program structure. To those who had their own local social development programs where the lead activity was nutrition, or food production, or health, family planning was treated either as a "guest program," "tolerated" or "ignored." Some mayors considered the OUTREACH personnel as "POPCOM employees pursuing a national program."¹⁹ Such attitudes contributed to the mayors' minimal or total nonsupport of the family planning outreach activities so that in many rural communities, family planning activities were left at the periphery of local rural development. As succinctly voiced out by one mayor,

I do not believe that family planning should operate by itself as a program. In my town, family planning is incorporated in our nutrition program which is its entry point. I will not agree to a program that is being imposed on us, alluding to the OUTREACH as a national program of POPCOM and an imposition on local governments. Family planning is a national policy, but we implement the program our way.²⁰

(b) Funding of provincial OUTREACH activity

Funding of OUTREACH since its inception was shouldered by the USAID and the Philippine Government through POPCOM. Its implementation envisioned increasing participation and support of the local governments in the form of managing the funds of the program. Initial experience showed that local governments were deficient in meeting their shares and that they found OUTREACH too expensive.²¹

Local government support was provided for in Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 435 which directed the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Ministry, the Commission on Audit, and the provincial, municipal, and barangay councils "to facilitate the implementation of the *program of POPCOM*²² by authorizing the provinces and cities to gradually and progressively assume the responsibility of funding the costs of all population and family planning-related activities and projects agreed upon by POPCOM and the Provincial Governors and City Mayors for their respective jurisdictions." To strengthen the capability of local governments to share the costs of OUTREACH, POPCOM tried to negotiate an agreement with the Ministry of Local Government to permit local authorities to use the 20% Development Fund under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 144 for financing the OUTREACH program. The local governments, however, were not enthusiastic about the proposed agreement since it meant that funds for local development projects would be diverted to family planning, which to most of them was national program.

The terms for cost sharing of the program are contained in the memoranda of agreement signed each year between POPCOM and the provincial/city governments. The pattern of cost sharing in Batangas showed a very erratic updown trend, with POPCOM contributing the bigger share except in 1979. Actual releases however, were smaller than the pledged shares under the terms of the subagreements. Batangas contributions for family planning from 1976 to 1979 were lumped under social development, as in PROCOM; while for the last two releases in 1980 and 1981, they were under the item: Population Communication, not OUTREACH.

The political leadership contended that financing the OUTREACH family planning activity was rendered difficult by the very nature of the program itself. The Senior Executive Assistant expressed the view that "it is difficult to justify to the Sangguniang Bayan²³ the taking over of the population program by the provincial government. The effects of the program are indirect and have long gestation periods. They are not visible, unlike roads, barrio schools, and hospitals." With the present strategy of OUTREACH implementation, "family planning would be better off if delivered integrated with nutrition or health. Health aspects are difficult to quantify, but the effects, more or less are quantifiable."²⁴

The Governor observed that the program had shown some success as manifested in some economic and social improvements. "The population of the province has gone down to 2.2 million, but this is not the achievement of the program alone. Our population is affected by migration, since the province is a growth corridor. Although the program can work here, family planning is also hardest to evaluate since it is something that is not quantifiable."²⁵

The Senior Executive Assistant raised the question of priority. "Even when there will be funding, in what priority will population be? It would be better if the national government place the POPCOM funds under the province. We will budget them for OUTREACH, and report to POPCOM our expenses. Of course, POPCOM will provide us the guidelines. Under the present setup, the province cannot fully support the program."²⁶

The provincial governor, on the other hand, expressed the view that Batangas is a place where the population program can be successful and where funding could be found. "At present, the province bears 30% of the program cost. There has been erratic trends in the fundings of the program, but not in my administration. Batangas can fund the program; we are rich in many resources. But it is a matter of priority. Our priorities right now are agricultural production especially food, road and port construction, and maybe a railway system."²⁷

Relating the program to the provincial financial capacity, the Governor reflected, "Under present conditions, the provincial government collects only 62% of the revenues. With increased collection effort, there will be enough resources for the program. However, if conditions remained unchanged in the next ten years, we will have to set priorities."²⁸

Implementing experience showed that the financial problem of incapacity to raise contributions in Batangas was compounded by the national funding scheme. The roundabout process of financial flow for POPCOM/US-AID funds normally resulted in delays. The delays in turn caused a chain reaction of problems in scheduling, personnel supervision and morale, program credibility, and service effectiveness.

The provincial leadership announced that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the Governor had not discussed anything pertaining to program take-over, just the sharing of costs. Nevertheless, indications through leadership pronouncements pointed to a family planning program redesign wherein the implementation details like funding, personnel management and other operating costs like salaries, travel, and living allowances must be dovetailed to fit the provincial development goals and pay/incentive schemes.

(c) Interpersonal and work relationships of OUTREACH workers²⁹

Working relationship within the provincial network for OUTREACH activities generally appeared to be without major problems. It was the personalities of the Provincial Population Officer (PPO) and Assistant Provincial Population Officer (AAPO) that sometimes gave their subordinates some

concern. Subordinates opined that their superiors were aloof and had minimal communication with them.

The district population officers (DPOs) perceived as sound their relationship with peers, full-time outreach workers (FTOWs), barangay service point officers (BSPOs), field workers of participating agencies, and the people of the community. They admitted however, that there were occasions when they found it difficult to exhort the BSPOs to work hard. They attributed this attitude to waning interest in the program and an unmet expressed desire for incentives if they were to continue as service supply points. The DPOs also encountered some problems with participating agencies which gave incentives to recruiters and acceptors; such practice put them at a less competitive posture.

The interpersonal relationship existing among the FTOWs was smooth since they worked more as a team and treated each other as brothers and sisters. It was in the relationships with BSPOs where problems usually occur. FTOWs complained of difficulty in getting the BSPOs perform the task assigned to them. They traced this difficulty to the fact that the BSPOs were required to do time-demanding chores without any commensurate incentives or rewards for work done. As a consequence of the poor motivation of the BSPOs, the FTOWs met difficulties in reaching the people of the rural communities. The traditional values regarding the family and children persisted. If ever there were acceptors, such acceptors used the less effective methods like withdrawal and rhythm.

With regard to the field workers of other participating agencies, the FTOWs admitted some problems in working with them. Cases cited by FTOWs were program-induced and were traceable to duplication and overlapping of work, lack of coordination among participants in the network, and conflict in the delivery of services. Added to these problems were cases of jealousy and competition in enlisting acceptors in order to achieve the FTOW's and BSPO's respective targets.

The OUTREACH program structure reached the barangay level through the barangay service point officers (BSPOs). It was made clear when they were enlisted as volunteers that there would be no salary nor any monetary rewards for their participation. Most often, the BSPOs were the barangay captains or their wives who accepted the job to serve the people and to enhance their influence and status in the community.

A review of the functions of the outreach workers from the PPO to the FTOWs showed that these POPCOM-paid workers performed generally the following major functions: managerial/supervisory, facilitative/supportive, external linkages and community relations. Although the FTOWs were

charged with the function of educating the clients toward the concept of small family size and pill/condom dispensing, the function of client processing required at the lowest operational level was entrusted to the BSPOs. The FTOWS's functions of pill/condom dispensing, IEC/motivation, clinic referral, and recording and reporting were just about all that the outreach program was operationally supposed to do. It was not surprising when the BSPOs expressed their disappointments and frustration that they were doing all dirty work and yet did not get paid for their time and effort. The program administrators should take note that they have entrusted the ultimate deciding factor of success or failure of the OUTREACH program into the hands of volunteers who are the least trained and motivated in the total OUTREACH implementation network.

(d) Implementation inputs and support system

Positive interpersonal relationships among the outreach workers indicated sound personnel management. The staffing of the outreach positions and certain personnel practices however, produced some dysfunctions. The practice of having OUTREACH personnel recruited and selected at the regional level, following rigid qualification designs and civil service requirements, often left needed positions to be vacant. The ten positions for the DPOs were never filled up at any one time, leaving 2 to 3 items always vacant since 1978.

To meet the work demand, POPCOM resorted to the practice of concurrent appointments in acting capacity. Thus, it was normal to find DPOs holding concurrent positions as FTOWs or exceptional FTOWs appointed concurrently as DPOs. In addition, there was the prevailing practice of assigning and reassigning OUTREACH personnel to different districts and municipalities. Such practices were vulnerable to local politics.

Insecurity, low motivation and morale, and frustration were some behavioral problems caused by the contractual status of outreach workers. The "coterminus with the project" caveat printed in their CSC appointment papers encouraged them to look for alternative jobs as they performed their outreach work. They also sought answer on whether they were national or local government employees. They needed immediate answer because when benefits like across-the-board salary increases were given to provincial employees, the outreach workers were not included since "they were POPCOM employees," and vice-versa. The dual supervision that they were subjected to likewise put them in a very vulnerable position. It would be very difficult to walk the tightrope in a politically sensitive area as Batangas when one does not know who his real boss is.

Given the responsibility for outreach activities, the supportive inputs to enable them to be effective were inadequate. Transportation allowance, con-

traceptive supplies, and IEC materials were never available in the right quantity, at the right place, and at the right time. Such was the result of bureaucratic red tape and control which rendered such inputs to be slow in coming. Transport was a big problem for the outreach workers who had to take the public utility vehicles plying the routes of their areas of assignment, hitch with government or private vehicles, or most of the time, walk to their places of destination. The provincial road system which is in a state of deterioration compounded the difficulty of the outreach workers to maximize their time and to reach as many places and areas of coverage as possible within a given planned period. Inadequate and delayed traveling allowances did not help them with their problem.

The implementing problems were obvious to the extent that the Office of the Governor, after having been with the program for a year, could not help but make a very candid observation. "We cannot say the POPCOM is running the program smoothly. If they cannot manage the program smoothly, why pass it on to the local governments?"³⁰

Policy and Implementation Issues

Integration Issues at Policy Level

As shown by the two case studies, the national population policy and program set its own goals and objectives which are expected to be achieved through the local programs. The local governments, on the other hand, have goals and policies on population which are not always congruent with those of the national program. The national policy of integration reflects broad statements of population goals and identifies relevant sectors like health, education, employment, labor; and local governments upon which these goals have implications. When the sectors and local governments translate and integrate population with sectoral and rural developments, they experience great difficulty because of differences in the time frame for population and for the sectoral/rural development goals. Corollary to this difficulty is the differences in program priorities between the national and local programs and the corresponding problem of making decisions as to which elements of development could easily be integrated.

The variance in time frames and developmental priorities between the population program and those of rural development renders justification for financial support for family planning more difficult. Local governments find the nature of the program a constraint. The difficulty of quantifying the results of the program as a contributory, interactive, and synergistic element in bringing about improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the people in rural communities, especially of the rural poor, makes it hard for the local political leadership to garner sustained financial and linkage support for

the family planning program. As various agencies and institutions belonging to the public and private sectors converge at one point for service integration, coordination became more difficult and a recurring issue.

The policy of integration also raises the issue of what mechanisms to use for integration, what corresponding organizational arrangements, both political and administrative, are effective; and what components of rural development to integrate. The ideal choice is to select components which are interrelated and interdependent to ensure smooth integration and avoid conflict in service delivery.

The mechanisms for integration being utilized by the national program are legislation, planning resource allocation and coordinative bodies. Experience shows such mechanisms to be ineffective. "Integration of population elements cannot occur just by top policy pronouncement."^{3 1} Integration activities must have carefully planned resources allocated to these activities and implement them to see if they will work. The policy-to-action conversion scheme would require "considerable effort for increased understanding of the interaction between the population variables"^{3 2} and the sectoral/rural development activities such as health, nutrition, education, agriculture, community development, among others.

To integrate family planning with rural development, local governments normally use the local priority development subprograms as entry point for family planning: health in Laguna; agricultural productivity in Batangas; and nutrition or health programs in some municipalities. They stress the interdependent relationships between demographic factors and socio-economic progress directly in terms of better living conditions and less of poverty and its socio-economic dysfunctions. Although the national mechanisms for integration send out similar messages, the parameters of integration results are macro or national in context. These parameters differ from those of local governments' parameters which are fitted and suitable to the existing indigenous rural conditions, needs, and demands.

Integrative mechanisms also show a tendency for central control, thus, stifling meaningful sectoral and local government initiative and participation in the integration process. Bureaucratic controls impede the process since such prescription allows very limited interactive and interdependent linking of sectoral and local development activities. The subagreements which the participating agencies and local governments contracted with POPCOM together with the administrative regulations of USAID and POPCOM, prevent the public and private sectors and the other participating agencies and local governments from collaborating on activities through joint decision-making and planning, combined resources, and teamwork in order to achieve better output and at the same time avoid conflict and competition.

The choice of what organizational arrangements to use in integration remains difficult because the options available do not guarantee results. The choice is between administrative/structural integration and service/process integration, or a combination of both. The first type of integration brings the different specialized activities to be linked under the administrative and budgetary control of a single organizational unit; while the second type maintains the administrative integrity of the specialized activities but bring them together at the point of service delivery.³³ PROCOM in Batangas and the original indigenous family planning program in Laguna in 1966 were examples of administrative/structural integration, while TIDA was an example of service/process integration. OUTREACH tried to combine both types, and yet was not. It maintained the administrative integrity of the subcontracting sectors and local governments and participating agencies while at the same time it imposed restrictive administrative control which threatened such integrity. It "integrated" family planning activities with the other specialized activities of development at the local level and yet implemented family planning activities directly as a single purpose program which operated tangentially with the local/rural development stream. In attempting to achieve both advantages of the two types, OUTREACH succeeded in attaining fragmented process and fragmented structure.

The consequential issues for whichever choice are performance and accountability. The issues are made more complex since they also involve and impinge on other issues like funding, decentralization/control, community participation, and efficiency/effectiveness. It is our assumption that TIDA was abandoned in favor of OUTREACH because the service integration evolved in the total integrated development package could not account for the output in socio-economic development which, in turn, could be attributed to family planning inputs. The national program also showed a decline in program efficiency and effectiveness as TIDA became involved in total development. As in TIDA, the concrete results in demographic terms with its long gestation period were unmanifested and deeply subsumed in the development outputs.

To clear the confusions and problems evoked by the policy of integration, the national program through POPCOM should carefully reexamine and evaluate the policy to understand better the type and level of integration desired and feasible, identify the critical policy elements to be strengthened and determine the appropriate arrangements for effective integration which fit local situations and evoke sustained local government and community participation and initiative. New policies or modifications in the present policy are indicative of what type and level of integration would be more feasible and effective. The type of integration should give the rural poor more venues to express demands, while the level of integration sought should fit in the integrative mechanisms existing in the rural communities

and should include considerations of the tradeoffs between increasing complexity and the resulting benefits of integration.³⁴ Policy choices for integrative arrangements are service integration, coordinated programs, addition of population activities to regular duties, or family planning as part of developmental activities.³⁵

The Issue of Decentralization and Control

National-local government relation is central to the issue of decentralization and control encountered in the population/family planning program. The national program design, particularly OUTREACH, recognizes that the participation of the local governments enhances the implementation of the program. Yet, it holds back on the requisites of local government participation such as decentralization, effective local leadership and political support, and meaningful community participation. Increasing the administrative effectiveness of local governments as initiators and implementors of program activities requires giving greater autonomy and flexibility in decisions over resources allocation and program management. It remains a critical issue how much the central government is prepared to grant the degree of local control that is necessary for effective local government participation. The OUTREACH program shows a contradiction between the national government desire for control and its desire to promote participation.

The organization and management processes in the national program reinforce the rigidity of the financial system by imposing an administrative control scheme which stifles active local participation in the program. OUTREACH is expected to perform uniformly throughout the country, thereby, denying the flexibility it needs to adapt readily to varying local conditions. Laguna and Batangas are two local governments whose family planning programs clearly depict rigidity to adapt to local conditions like political sensitivity to population and family planning issues, the level of social and economic development, and the local administrative capacity for development program implementation.

To increase the financial capacity of local governments to share and eventually absorb total program costs, efforts should be undertaken to relax the financial and administrative control of POPCOM through the gradual devolution of financial and administrative autonomy to local governments. Where strong local governments and community institutions are present, POPCOM should encourage their initiative and active participation to plan, fund, implement, and evaluate population/family planning integration activities.

A more mediative/facilitative type of control is for the central government through POPCOM to provide the local governments and institutions

adequate technical, financial, and logistic support which will strengthen them, not control them; and a supervisory system which will provide direction and guidelines to foresee implementing problems and to take steps for their resolution. An information system to assist the local governments in decision-making could complement the mediative control system herein proposed. A more specific policy alternative is for the national government to incorporate local population plans and programs and their corresponding resource requirements into the regional and national development plans, then for central government to directly release the resources/funds together with broad implementing guidelines to the local governments. The local governments should be given the discretion/autonomy to decide and act on day-to-day management of the program as an integral part of rural development:

Organizational and Management Issues

Program implementation issues in integration of population/family planning with rural development focus on 1) the issue of dual administrative/technical supervision; 2) the funding issue; and 3) the issue of personnel.

The dual supervision created conflicts in role between and among the participants in the integrative network: the Governor, POPCOM Regional Coordinator, the provincial population officer, the subordinate outreach workers and clientele as well. Moreover, the program operated under political and personal interrelationships obtaining at the local level, so that the pattern of management closely followed that of the existing political and personal sensitivities.

In terms of coordinative linkages leading to integration, the role and position of the Governor as project manager is rendered weak and vulnerable by existing POPCOM regulations/arrangements. Thus, as the lead person in coordinating local family planning goals and rural development, the Governor found himself wanting in power and authority to "call the shots." To reinforce the recommendation on autonomy previously advanced,³⁶ the alternative strategy should be for the POPCOM to provide the Governor strong and adequate technical assistance and support with regard to the technical aspects of family planning in lieu of technical supervision. This will consolidate authority and power in the Governor and complement political leadership and responsibility for the family planning program at the local level.

The funding issue has long been a standing problem in program implementation and has generated more field problems as noted in the cases and in the section on decentralization and control. This issue which is critical in the success or failure of program operations, has been least attended to

during the more than a decade history of implementation. Palliative measures were undertaken like bringing financial decision-making one level lower in the hierarchy,³⁷ abandonment of the dysfunctional reimbursement scheme which caused too much delay and frustrations in the field, and adoption of a consultation process in the matter of cost sharing, to mention a few. However, the issue remains unsolved because the basic systemic component of the funding issue, that of devolution of financial authority and decisions to local governments, has not been acted upon. The funding and disbursing schemes adopted for the population program still follow that of bureaucratic control. To resolve the funding issue, devolution of financial autonomy must be granted to local governments under a specially devised accountability system.

The personnel issue meanwhile is occasioned by the dual supervision and funding systems. A crisis of identity existed among population workers: Are they national or local government employees? The answer is very important as it is the source of low motivation and frustration, low performance despite competence, and insecurity. Most population workers under OUTREACH feel insecure with the contractual and temporary status of their appointments.

The practice of concurrent/acting appointments to fill vacant positions, coupled with the practice of rotation of outreach workers to different districts, municipalities and barangays results in periods of adjustment and low morale which, in turn, decrease their efficiency and effectiveness in the field. The personnel situation goads the population workers to seek alternative employment as they go about their functions. Eventually, many of them became turnover statistics.

A direct consequence of the dual supervision and funding arrangements in the program is the low and inadequate administrative and logistics support system crucial to outreach effectiveness. Mobilization of the people and local community groups and organizations could be gained only through direct contact and interaction between the community and the program workers. Poor workers' mobility and outreach ineffectiveness are traced partly to poor transport support and delayed travel allowances, inadequate contraceptive supplies and IEC material reaching the clientele level.

Concurrent to the grant of autonomy, both political and financial, managerial responsibility should be shifted from the national level to local governments. Decentralization appears, in the face of the issues confronting the integration policy and process, to be a better alternative especially since the national program anyway envisions eventual takeover of the population/family planning activity by the local governments.

The Issue of Community Participation

Community participation is widely believed to be a critical requirement for the success of the population or any development program.³⁸ Community participation requires effective local leadership and political support. It also requires a considerable amount of decentralization or devolution of financial resources and reduction in administrative control.³⁹

The issue of community participation revolves around the following questions: What kind of participation? Who are participating? What process of participation or how are the communities participating?⁴⁰

The population program mobilizes community participation by carving out roles for members of the communities either as volunteer barrio supply point officers or as direct but passive program beneficiaries. They are given directions from above. They are not given direct stimulation or encouragement to take the initiative themselves. On the contrary, there is the Laguna example where clearly, the indigenous initiative and effort are being stifled and manipulated toward national goals; and Batangas as an example of a local government struggling to get out of the central government grip and control.

Corollary to what kind of participation is the question of process of participation. Are community members involved only in implementation or in the whole process of goal setting, planning, resource allocation, implementation, and evaluation? Are the processes of involvement passive or active?

Another dimension of community participation is the presence or absence of local institutions and local non-governmental organizations. When present, how weak or how strong are they? How are they selected for participation? If absent, what measures are undertaken to create them?

The question of efficiency of programs with community participation can be raised by the central as well as the local programs. The issue is very relevant when considered with the conceptual design of OUTREACH. It may be necessary to accept some initial decline in program efficiency while inexperienced local governments/groups learn to manage their own services. The Laguna initial local program shows the clear advantage of community participation, while OUTREACH implementation in Laguna and Batangas demonstrates some dysfunctions of inefficiency when local groups, that is, the barrio supply point volunteers are involved in the delivery of family planning services. Is the national program ready to suffer lower performance during the transition period of program management to the local governments?

The alternative to the present implementation strategy with regard to community participation is for the national program to encourage local initiative and allow the community to participate all the way from planning, target setting, program implementation to evaluation, including generating and managing resources. The disadvantaged groups, like the women and the rural poor, must be given a chance to participate in meaningful roles like in making decision as to the family size and strategies in achieving family welfare under the encouraging support of the community organizations and leaders. Means to bring about the participation of the disadvantaged groups must be devised if rural development in all its dimensions, is to be achieved and enjoyed by these groups.

The Issue of Sectoral and Environmental Linkages

The resolution of the issue of sectoral and environmental linkages is imperative for successful integration. A necessary input for systemic synergy, through sectoral and environmental linking of specialized developmental activities should be strengthened and made interdependent and interactive to achieve unity of efforts.

Despite the policy of intersectoral, multi-agency participation, the population program is continually beset with the problem of weak and ineffective sectoral and environmental linkages. Conflicts and negative competition exist in the program due to duplication and overlapping of functions and activities, differences in time frames and priorities of the specialized activities, differing accountability systems, and differing regular functional responsibilities of the participating agencies engaged in the integration network.

The causes are systemic: limitations imposed by the subagreements, inflexibility brought about by administrative controls, and an uncertain and sometimes hostile operating socio-economic and politico-cultural environments. Religious biases, cultural norms and values, political motivations contribute to weak societal and environmental support linkages.

A difficulty may be encountered in resolving the issue of weak sectoral and environmental linkages since it will be a function of the combined effects of the recommended policy options and implementing strategy alternatives advanced in this paper. It will take a long time for all the recommendations to be adopted, be implemented and produced desired effects. Nevertheless, implementation of policy recommendations affecting the dynamics of the integration process like decentralization, removal of bureaucratic restrictions, both of which are within control of policy makers and administrators would be a start towards issue resolution.

Summary and Conclusion

Integration has been adopted in the Philippine population/family planning program both as a policy and a strategy of implementation. The tales of the two provinces of Laguna and Batangas demonstrated the various issues confronting the integration of population/family planning with rural development.

The issues are summarized as follows: (1) incongruence of policy goals and time frames of the specialized activities in the integration network: this leads to the issues of developmental services "mixes" and organizational designs; (2) decentralization and decontrol: this issue aptly captures the government's dilemma in the development process, its desire for control vs. participation; (3) community participation: the central issues are what kind of participation? who are participating? and how do the community and people participate? ; (4) difficulty of intersectoral and central-local government coordination: corollary issues are what mechanisms to adopt, what specialized activities to integrate, and under what political and administrative conditions the integrated specialized activities will flourish? ; (5) organizational and management issues like dual supervision, funding, and personnel dynamics/behavior and management; and (6) difficulty of attaining supportive sectoral and environmental linkages to sustain integration.

The issues confronting the policy and strategy of integration appear formidable for resolution. Single measures of action will not suffice. A total systems approach to solve the issues is more appropriate. The interdependence and interaction which exist between and among the issues heighten the futility of fragmented actions.

The paper puts forward a concerted policy and implementation package of recommendations which must be undertaken simultaneously or properly phased, depending on developmental and program priorities and available resources. This is required so as to effect complementary and synergistic impact on the negative forces blocking success in the integration process.

The systemic package of recommendations consists of:

(1) a policy review and evaluation to find out the determinants of success or failure of integration in order to arrive at policy alternatives which can lead to higher and efficient integration of population/family planning with rural development;

(2) a move toward decentralization and decontrol. Devolution of political, administrative and resource allocation of powers/authority from the central government to local governments will make them equal partners in

development. Immediate relaxation of existing administrative control in the integration system must be made. This way, local governments would have strong roles in the integration process and cultivate self-reliance and managerial capability to achieve population and rural development goals and objectives;

(3) an action measure to activate community and clientele participation in the integration and rural development processes. The disadvantaged groups, especially the women and the rural poor, must be organized and become involved not only as passive beneficiaries, but as planners and implementors. It is only when they participate that they can make demands. It is only when they can make demands that they can share the benefits, responsibility, as well as costs of services/components included in the integrated programs for rural development;

(4) issue-specific action measures are advanced as follows: (a) provision of strong technical support for local governments in lieu of technical supervision; (b) direct fund releases to local governments with a specially-devised accountability system suitable for the integrated programs in lieu of present defective one; (c) resolution of the personnel identity crisis to raise motivation, morale, and performance of program workers; and (d) transfer of responsibility for the integration of population with rural development to the local executives for them to "own" the program, feel responsible for it, and take necessary actions.

Any one measure taken singly and in isolation from the others would indeed be futile. The need for a holistic and systematic treatment of the issues for effective results is indispensable.

Some conclusions can be derived from the evidences and experiences presented in this paper: (1) Integration as a policy and strategy in the Philippine population/family planning program is presently not being achieved; (2) Integration of activities within the program is constrained by bureaucratic restrictions which do not permit joint and cooperative endeavors, cause overlapping and duplication of functions and activities, and foster conflict and petty competition between and among the different participants in the integration network; (3) Integration of population/family planning with rural development is difficult due to some inherent limitations like differences in time frames, priorities and invisible results of the population program vis-a-vis rural development; and (4) Local governments as active and equal partners in integration for rural development are not optimized due to inequitous central-local relations, restrictive administrative requirements and low capability to fund and manage the integrated programs.

Endnotes

¹The Laguna study was commissioned by ESCAP and presented to Regional Seminar on Evaluation of Schemes and Strategies for Integrated Family Planning Programmes with Special Reference to Increased Involvement of Local Institutions, June 15-22, 1981, ESCAP, Bangkok, Thailand.

²The Batangas OUTREACH Program research was funded by the Australian Government through ASEAN Population Office and POPCOM.

³UN ESCAP, Report of the Regional Seminar on Evaluation of Schemes and Strategies for Integrated Family Planning Programmes with Special Reference to Increased Involvement of Local Institutions, *Asian Population Studies Series No. 51*, (New York: United Nations, 1981), p. 9, para. 15.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 10, para. 23.

⁵Jose M. Lawas, "Concepts and Strategies of Rural Development" in Dionisia A. Rola, (ed.) *Integrated Rural Development: Problems and Issues*, (U.P. Management Education Council, 1981), p. 19.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷U. Aziz, "Poverty and Rural Development in Malaysia," *Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia* (Malaysian Economic Studies), Vol. 1, No. 1, (June 1964), p. 87 cited in Diosdado Nucez and Angelito Manalili, "Complementation and Integration of Rural Development Programs," in Dionisia Z. Rola, ed. *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

⁸Incumbent Governor Felicisimo T. San Luis has been in office from 1960 until the present time, so that the provincial socio-economic development plan and the provincial population program have enjoyed continuity of leadership support and commitment.

⁹The local executive at any of the local government levels has to justify his budget for operations to the local legislative bodies for corresponding appropriations.

¹⁰With the establishment of POPCOM, planning for the population program became a central authority prerogative. Local governments are not participants to planning at the national level but are involved only when it comes to implementation. Later, the bottom-up planning scheme was adopted, but despite this, they have to conform with the requirements imposed by the national program.

¹¹Subagreements signed by participating agencies with POPCOM contain objectives and operating guidelines. They also provide stipulations regarding funds, management, and operating systems. Personnel of OUTREACH are formally appointed by the Governor, but in practice their recruitment, selection, placement, supervision and performance evaluation rest with POPCOM regional and provincial officers.

¹²To facilitate and cut down on delays, the program now places the responsibility for financial decisions for disbursements at the level of the Regional Coordinators. The delays have been minimized to some extent, but since financial reports come along with reports on service statistics, additional delay sometimes is encountered because of the reporting system.

¹³Mr. Dominador Labit, retired Provincial Administrator was taken in by the Governor as Provincial Population Officer. A veteran in provincial affairs, he was instrumental in helping the local population/family planning program course through difficult times.

¹⁴The Population Center Foundation (PCF) is a private institution responsible for harnessing the resources and capability of the private sector in complementation with those available to POPCOM for the public sector. The First Lady is the Founding Chairman of PCF.

¹⁵The Governor referred to is Gov. Feliciano Leviste who was the provincial executive from 1948 until his retirement in 1971. He holds the record of the longest tenure for any provincial governor in the Philippines. Leviste had established strong ties with a large number of municipal and barrio leaders across the province. The strong rural support for Leviste goes beyond political party considerations.

¹⁶The organizational set-up under OUTREACH differed a great deal from that of PROCOM. From a structure and program under the Governor as part of rural development, OUTREACH sets in place a line structure which is "technically" under POPCOM.

¹⁷The Senior Executive Assistant is the younger brother of the Governor. He possesses credentials which complement those of the Governor. He is approachable and amiable which makes people dealing with the Office of the Governor more at ease.

¹⁸Interview with Mr. Benjamin Laurel, Senior Executive Assistant to the Governor, Batangas Provincial Capitol, May 4, 1981.

¹⁹Consensus of opinions expressed by some mayors of Batangas interviewed during the field work between March to May, 1981. The mayors included those of Taysan, San Pascual, Bauan.

²⁰Interview with Mayor Bienvenido C. Castillo, Bauan Municipal Hall, May 14, 1981.

²¹Interviews with Governor Jose Laurel, Governor's Mansion, and with Senior Executive Assistant Benjamin Laurel, Batangas Capitol, on separate time periods on May 4, 1981.

²²Underscoring is that of the writer to call attention to the reason why some local executives were indifferent to the OUTREACH program and considered it to be "not our program."

²³The Sangguniang Bayan approves the provincial budget and any special appropriation for specific projects.

²⁴Quotation attributed to Mr. Benjamin Laurel, Senior Executive Assistant to the Governor, interview on May 4, 1981.

²⁵Quotation attributed to Governor Jose Laurel during an interview on May 4, 1981.

²⁶Quotation attributed to Mr. Benjamin Laurel, interview on May 4, 1981.

²⁷Quotation from Governor Jose Laurel during interview on May 4, 1981.

²⁸Quoted from interview with Governor Jose Laurel, May 4, 1981.

²⁹Discussions in this section are borne out by empirical data gathered during the field research conducted for a study on local government capability for the OUTREACH program which was funded by ASEAN Coordinating Office for Population under an Australian Government assistance.

³⁰Quotation attributed to Mr. Benjamin Laurel during interview on May 4, 1981.

³¹J.K. Satia, "Issues in Integrated Approaches to Family Planning Programmes," paper presented at the Regional Seminar on Evaluation of Schemes and Strategies for Integrated FP Programmes with Special Reference to Increased Involvement of Local Institutions, ESCAP, Bangkok, Thailand, June 15-22, 1981, p. 10. The writer was a participant to the seminar.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

³³Gayl Ness, "ESCAP Family Planning Program Integration: Strength, Weaknesses and Issues," paper presented at the Regional Seminar on Evaluation of Schemes and Strategies for Integrated Family Planning Programmes with Special Reference to Increased Involvement of Local Institutions, ESCAP, Bangkok, Thailand, June 15-22, 1981, pp. 3-4.

³⁴J.K. Satia, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 23-35.

³⁶Please refer to recommendation under the issue of decentralization and control contained in this paper.

³⁷From central to regional level.

³⁸UN. ESCAP, Asian Population Studies Series No. 51, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁰J.K. Satia, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30. The writer rephrased Satia's "What, Who and How?" which are issues also directly relevant to the cases presented in this paper.